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Abstract
One curious phenomenon of several social groups is that they are ‘redun-
dant’ in the sense that they contain more cooperators than strictly needed
to complete certain group tasks, such as foraging. Redundancy is puzzling
because redundant groups are particularly susceptible to invasion by de-
fectors. Yet, redundancy can be found in groups formed by a wide range
of organisms, including insects and microbes. Jonathan Birch ([2012]) has
recently argued that coercive behaviors might account for redundancy us-
ing insect colonies as a case study. However, microbial examples suggest
redundancy can evolve without coercive behaviors. This paper formulates
an explanation for redundancy that does not require targeted punishment
of defectors; instead, it proposes that redundancy might be due to igno-
rance. Specifically, it is suggested that redundancy evolves as a by-product
of selection when group members have to opt whether to cooperate or not
while being blind to the strategies of others. Accordingly, possessing in-
formation about the strategies of the group members might undermine
rather than facilitate cooperation within groups.
Keywords: redundancy; complex systems; cooperation; microbes; policing;
public goods games; division of labor.
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1 The evolution of redundancy
Social interactions often take place within sizable groups. In the case of human
evolution, being able to cooperate in large groups beyond the immediate fam-
ily likely proved crucial for the evolution of ethical norms (Bowles and Gintis,
[2011]). Insects often form colonies equipped with sophisticated systems of di-
vision of labor (Anderson et al., [2001]). Microbes have been living in dense
multicellular clusters called ‘biofilms’ for over three billion years (Westall et al.,
[2001]). Further, multicellular organisms are essentially groups of trillions of co-
operative cells that are nearly free of conflicts (Queller and Strassmann, [2009]).
Altogether these examples indicate that social evolution and group living con-
sistently go hand in hand within nature.
Social groups are expected to evolve via natural selection because organ-
isms are more likely to successfully complete certain tasks when they team up
(Anderson and Franks, [2001]; Krause and Ruxton, [2002]; Calcott, [2008]).1
1Group living can also negatively impact its members. For example, living as part of
groups can increase competition between group members, and groups might be more visible
to predators than solitary individuals. See Krause and Ruxton ([2002], ch. 3) for further
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Sometimes group tasks involve an intricate system of division of labor, such as
brood care in eusocial insects (Ho¨lldobler and Wilson, [2009]). In other cases,
group tasks are due to multiple individuals performing the same task. Army ants
can, for example, build bridges with their own bodies (Anderson et al., [2002]).
In the microbial world, bacterial cells can protect themselves from antibiotics
if enough cells produce a particular type of extracellular product (Stewart and
Costerton, [2001]; Flemming et al., [2016]).
Group tasks are often performed by ‘redundant’ groups in the sense that
they have more cooperators than typically necessary to complete the task. This
phenomenon is well-documented in insects, which often form colonies containing
more workers than strictly needed to perform colony functions, such as foraging
and caring for the brood. Additionally, the level of redundancy in insect colonies
is substantial, with multiple studies reporting that over half of the workers are
part of the ‘reserve’ labor force (Charbonneau et al., [2017]). Like insects, other
types of organisms also form redundant groups, including microbes (Rainey and
Rainey, [2003]) and mammals (Wilkinson, [1984]). Thus, as indicated by several
studies, group redundancy is ubiquitous in nature (Charbonneau and Dornhaus,
[2015]; Birch, [2017],2).2
One common type of explanation for redundancy is that it is adaptive at
the group-level. In particular, redundant groups are probably more resilient
to environmental fluctuations than non-redundant groups (Charbonneau et al.,
[2017]). The reason this occurs is because redundant groups can replace lost
workers due to environmental disturbances and mobilize extra workers in mo-
ments of need. Still, this type of explanation fails to explain why individuals
would cooperate in groups with a surplus of cooperators. First of all, group tasks
details.
2In fact, complex systems are often redundant in a broad sense, including genomes and
computer networks (Charbonneau and Dornhaus, [2015]; Nowak et al., [1997]; Albert et al.,
[2000]).
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are likely to be successfully completed in redundant groups and, as a result, the
expected benefit gained by becoming a cooperator is negligible (Birch, [2012]).
Furthermore, cooperating is costly and, sometimes, even deadly for individuals.
Basically, group redundancy exacerbates the free-rider problem since the incen-
tive to free-ride seems to increase in groups with a surplus of cooperators. Yet,
redundancy has been observed in a wide range of social organisms, including
microbes, insects, and mammals.3 Why is that?
This paper proposes that redundancy might be due to ‘ignorance’. Specif-
ically, it suggests that redundancy might evolve as a by-product of selection
when group members are behind some form of ‘Darwinian veil of ignorance’ in
the sense that they have to decide whether they will cooperate without know-
ing the strategy of the other members (Section 3).4 This explanation contrasts
with an account of redundancy recently advanced by Jonathan Birch ([2012]).
According to him, redundancy in some social groups, especially insect colonies,
might be due to coercive behaviors. The next section discusses Birch’s account
in more detail.
2 Explaining redundancy via coercion
Jonathan Birch ([2012]) recently suggested redundancy might be due to coercive
behaviors. In order to motivate his account, he draws a parallel between the
puzzle posed by redundancy and the ‘paradox of voting’. The paradox provides
as follows (Brennan, [2016]). The probability that one’s vote will change the
outcome of an election is minuscule. Moreover, the costs involved in taking the
time to vote seems to exceed the expected benefits of voting. Yet, people vote
3When formulated in terms of multilevel selection (Okasha, [2006]), the issue here is, even
though group-level selection might favor redundancy, individual-level selection appears to
suppress the evolution of redundancy. Accordingly, a satisfactory explanation for the evolution
of redundancy would need to show why individual-level selection does not override group-level
selection.
4The expression ‘Darwinian veil of ignorance’ is from Skyrms ([1996]).
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in large numbers. Birch ([2012]) claims that the extreme redundancy in insect
colonies raises a similar type of puzzle. In addition to being costly, the contri-
bution of any individual worker to the probability of task success is negligible
in redundant groups. Still, redundancy is pervasive in eusocial insect colonies.
Kin selection theory is often used to explain social behaviors in insect colonies
(Bourke, [2011]). As a result, kin selection theory is expected to provide a
promising framework for explaining redundancy. According to kin selection, a
gene for a cooperative trait can be favored by natural selection as long as the
beneficiaries of the cooperative behavior are other individuals carrying the same
gene. However, the level of genetic relatedness in insect societies is insufficient
to explain the evolution of altruism in the absence of coercion (Ratnieks and
Wenseleers, [2008]). Moreover, Birch ([2012]) argues that indirect benefits due
to shared genes are insufficient to solve the puzzle posed by extreme redun-
dancy. His reasoning is that even if indirect benefits are added to the picture,
the puzzle posed by extreme redundancy persists because it is still the case
that individual workers ‘incur huge direct costs in return for extremely small
expected indirect benefits’ (Birch, [2012], p. 375). That is, appealing to indirect
benefits does not change the fact that the costs seem to outweigh the benefits
of cooperating in redundant groups. Because of this, Birch contends that an
additional mechanism is needed to tip the scale in favor of cooperation.
Birch ([2012]) proposes that within-group coercion might have enabled the
evolution of redundancy. Birch’s proposal is based on empirical studies that
report that altruism in insect colonies can be enforced by worker policing (Rat-
nieks and Wenseleers, [2008]). According to these studies, even though workers
in such colonies can defect by laying their own eggs, some workers police the
colony by eating the eggs laid by other workers, but not the eggs laid by the
queen. In this way, policing might tip the scale in favor of cooperation by mak-
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ing defection too costly which, in turn, enables the evolution of redundancy in
insect colonies.5 In Birch’s words:
When an effective coercive regime is in place, large numbers of work-
ers may stably participate in large-scale cooperative tasks even when
the expected inclusive fitness benefit conferred by their own individ-
ual contributions is extremely small, because the cost of participat-
ing is fully counterbalanced by the costs imposed on defectors. The
effect of systematic coercion is thus to modify the selective environ-
ment in such a way as to make the evolution of extreme redundancy
possible (Birch, [2012], p. 377).
It is unclear whether Birch’s account is sufficient to explain redundancy in
the microbial world. Microbial groups often rely on public goods, such as en-
zymes, which are costly to produce but enhance the fitness of neighboring cells.
Similar to insect colonies, microbial groups can also be redundant in the sense
that they can possess more public good producers (cooperators) than strictly
necessary to maintain the group functions. For instance, biofilms can persist
even when some of their inhabitants are free-riders and do not contribute to
the biofilm construction (Rainey and Rainey, [2003]; Vlamakis et al., [2008]).
Birch’s explanation is compelling in the case of insect colonies largely because
the insects’ ability to coerce defectors is well-documented. Although microbes
can punish free-riders by producing bacteriocins, such as colicins in Esherichia
coli, this type of coercion is expected to exist under limited conditions in mi-
crobes (Travisano and Velicer, [2004]).6 In other words, targeted punishment is
5Although Birch ([2012]) doubts that appealing to indirect benefits is sufficient to explain
the evolution of redundancy, he does claim that coercive behaviors may have evolved via kin
selection.
6In order to engage in policing, the bacteriocins need to harm cheaters but not cooperators.
This type of policing could evolve via linked ‘greenbeard alleles’ (Dawkins, [1976]) that code
for the production of the toxin and the identification tag, as illustrated by the genes that code
for colicin production in E. coli (Travisano and Velicer, [2004]). Nevertheless, greenbeard
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unlikely to be the rule in the microbial world.
Microbial groups thus suggest that redundancy can evolve without the pres-
ence of coercive behaviors in the group. Following this lead, the next section
suggests that redundancy can evolve in the absence of coercion as long as the
group members possess limited information about the proportion of cooperators
in the group. To put it simply, the next section proposes that redundancy can
be due to ignorance.
3 Explaining redundancy via ignorance
3.1 Cooperation behind the Darwinian veil of ignorance
The benefit generated by completing a group task is typically not the sum of the
contribution of each cooperator in the group (Birch, [2017]; Archetti and Scheur-
ing, [2012]; Pedroso, [2018]). In particular, when there are enough cooperators
to complete a task, further increasing the number of cooperators will likely not
produce as much benefit due to diminishing returns. This might happen because
the benefit conferred by a resource is constrained by the individual’s ability to
utilize the resource. For example, the higher the amount of blood stored by a
vampire bat, the lower the return rate for retaining more blood by the same bat
(Wilkinson, [1984]). In yeast, about 99% of the digested sugars generated from
invertase production dissipates away from the producer cells, which suggests
that the benefits conferred by invertase saturates once the amount of invertase
in the group surpasses a certain level (Gore et al., [2009]).
The puzzle posed by redundancy is largely due to the effect of diminishing
returns on group tasks. Specifically, redundancy evolves when the reward for
being a cooperator seems negligible once the number of cooperators exceeds a
alleles are expected to be unstable because they are vulnerable to the evolution of defectors
that possess the identification tag but fail to produce the costly toxin (Birch, [2017]).
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threshold value, say, k. Due to diminishing returns, having k + 1 as opposed
to k cooperators does not considerably increase the chance that the group task
will be completed successfully. The overall puzzle is that organisms in nature,
such as bees and microbes, cooperate even when they belong to groups that
have more than k cooperators. According to Birch’s ([2012]) hypothesis, even
though k cooperators may be sufficient to complete a group task, there may
be more than k cooperators because within-group policing increases the cost
of being a non-cooperator. Policing thus makes cooperation relatively cheaper
which, in turn, enables the evolution of redundancy.
The puzzle posed by redundancy becomes more challenging if the focal in-
dividual is ‘well-informed’ in the sense that the individual possesses complete
information about the amount of cooperators in the group. For the sake of
simplicity, suppose that a group task, such as hunting a mammoth, requires
exactly k cooperators for the task to be performed successfully. In the absence
of policing, a well-informed individual is only expected to cooperate when the
group contains k− 1 cooperators. If there are k or more cooperators, becoming
a cooperator is unwarranted because the group already has enough coopera-
tors to hunt the mammoth successfully. Moreover, hunting is a risky endeavor,
which makes cooperation costly. Alternatively, if the number of cooperators is
strictly lower than k − 1, becoming a cooperator would be pointless because
the hunt would fail either way.7 Accordingly, in the absence of policing, being
well-informed about the strategies of the other players undermines the evolution
of cooperation.
In contrast, redundancy might evolve without the need of coercive behaviors
if the group members are ignorant about the strategies of the other members.
7The assumption that hunting a mammoth requires exactly k cooperators might strike
the reader as being too unrealistic. However, as argued in Section 3.2, formal results involv-
ing public goods games suggest that relaxing this assumption does not alter the qualitative
behavior of the game.
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When individuals do not know what others will do, it is as if the individu-
als have to decide whether they will cooperate while being behind some form
of ‘Darwinian veil of ignorance’ (Skyrms, [1996]). Even without knowing the
strategy of the other group members, there are incentives for both cooperating
and free-riding. On the one hand, individuals have an incentive to cooperate
because completing the group task is beneficial for them. That is, having k
or more cooperators produces a benefit that is shared by the group, such as
the spoils of the hunt. On the other hand, cooperation is costly and, for this
reason, it would be preferable for an individual to free-ride on others. In other
words, an individual would be better off if it could obtain the benefits from the
group task (e.g., food) without having to pay the costs. Accordingly, without
knowing what others will do, individuals are expected to bet on cooperating
with a certain probability.
There is a parallel between the discussion above and the evolution of flex-
ible behaviors (Sterelny, [2003]). At first glance, organisms living in hetero-
geneous environments are expected to exhibit some level of behavioral flex-
ibility because organisms that adopt invariant strategies would be penalized
in such environments. However, as Sterelny ([2003]) observes, environmental
heterogeneity selects for variable response ‘only if that heterogeneity is cued
to the organism’ (p. 12). As a result, organisms living in an ‘informationally
opaque’ environment—in the sense that the environment is intractably complex
for them—‘must settle for a single best-overall response’ (p. 12). Accordingly,
flexible behaviors are more likely to evolve when organisms live in ‘information-
ally transparent’ environments. A similar point can be made about group tasks.
If the player’s strategies are ‘informationally opaque’ during group tasks, players
are expected to cooperate with an intermediary probability. In contrast, if the
strategies of other players are ‘informationally transparent’ for an individual,
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this individual is only expected to voluntarily cooperate when its contribution
is indispensable for completing the group task.8
In the next section, a particular type of public goods game is used to il-
lustrate the social dilemma posed by group tasks when players’ strategies are
informationally opaque. This game can be understood as formalizing the ar-
gument presented above. The next section thus provides further support for
the claim that individuals are expected to cooperate with a certain probability
when they lack information about the strategies of the other players.
3.2 Modeling group tasks with a public goods game
Suppose individuals form groups with N members. Cooperators pay a cost of
c in order to produce the public good. Every member of the group obtains a
benefit b (> c) if and only if the number of producers in the group is equal or
higher than the threshold value τ , where 1 < τ < N . Accordingly, receiving the
benefit b means that the group successfully completed the group task. Players
cooperate with a probability x ∈ [0, 1] and free-ride with a probability 1 − x.
This is a ‘simultaneous’ game in the sense that players choose their strategies
without knowing the strategies of the other players.9
In order to determine whether this game admits an Evolutionary Stable
Strategy (ESS), suppose the focal player cooperates with a chance y and the
other N−1 players cooperate with a chance x. The expected fitness of the focal
player is:
W (y;x) =
N−1∑
j=τ
pj(x)b+ y · g(x), (1)
8I thank one of the referees for suggesting this parallel with Sterelny’s ([2003]) work.
9This game relies on Bach et al.’s ([2006]) framework for ‘threshold games’. In addition
to Bach et al. ([2006]), several papers have studied similar games, including Archetti ([2009]);
Pacheco et al. ([2009]) and Archetti and Scheuring ([2011]). See Archetti and Scheuring
([2012]) for a review of the literature on threshold games.
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where pj(x) is the probability that j of the other N − 1 players will cooperate:
pj(x) =
(
N − 1
j
)
xj(1− x)N−1−j , (2)
and g(x) is the expected gain when the focal player cooperates:
g(x) = pτ−1(x)b− c. (3)
The strategy x is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) when W (x;x) ≥ W (y;x), for all
y 6= x. Accordingly, the pure strategy of always cooperating (x = 1) is not a NE,
but always defecting (x = 0) is. Furthermore, x is a mixed NE if g(x) = 0; that
is, when pτ−1(x) = c/b. A strategy x is an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
if a population playing x can resist being invaded by a few mutants playing any
other strategy (Broom et al., [1997]). As Bach et al. ([2006]) prove, a mixed
strategy x in this type of game is an ESS when g(x) = 0 (x is a NE) and
g′(x) < 0.
The behavior of the function pτ−1(x) dictates whether the game admits
a mixed ESS. Since pτ−1(x) is the mass function of a binomial distribution
(Eq. 2), this function possesses a single maximum when x∗ = (τ − 1)/(N − 1).
Accordingly, if pτ−1(x∗) < c/b, the game does not possess a mixed NE. If
pτ−1(x∗) > c/b, the game admits two mixed NE, x− < x∗ and x+ > x∗. Of
these two mixed NE, x+ is the only ESS because g
′(x+) < 0. As an example,
consider a group of 10 individuals in which only 4 cooperators are required to
generate the group benefit, and that b = 5c. The function pτ−1(x) is plotted
below:
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The dashed line intercepts the two mixed NE: x− ≈ 0.22 (unstable) and x+ ≈
0.46 (ESS). Accordingly, group members are expected to cooperate about 46%
of the time at ESS. If a few mutants evolve that cooperate, say, 30% or 60%
of the time, these mutants will be selected against.10 This game thus nicely
illustrates how group tasks generate incentives for both cooperating and free-
riding. As a result of these incentives, if the benefit generated by the group task
is sufficiently high, individuals are expected to cooperate with a probability
between zero and one, despite their lack of knowledge about the strategies of
others.
One potential limitation of the public goods game introduced in this section
is that the group benefit is modeled by a ‘sharp’ function: the group benefit is
only produced when there are τ or more cooperators (Figure 1A).11 In contrast,
the benefit generated by group tasks likely follows a ‘smooth’ function before
reaching the threshold τ in the sense that the group benefit gradually increases
as the number of cooperators raises from zero to τ (Figure 1B). For example,
it seems that the thicker the biofilm the lower the chance that an antimicrobial
agent will successfully penetrate the biofilm (Stewart and Costerton, [2001]).
However, as Bach et al. ([2006]) prove, using a smoother function does not
10Accordingly, finding ESSs also indicates how the game evolves over time. In particular,
ESSs are attractors of replicator dynamics (Hofbauer and Sigmund, [1998]).
11I thank one of the referees for pointing this out.
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(A) (B)
Figure 1: (A) Sharp condition. The resulting group benefit function is sharp in
the sense that it drastically changes its value when the number of cooperators
increases from zero to the threshold value τ = 4. (B) Smooth condition. Group
benefit increases smoothly as the number of cooperators reaches the threshold
τ = 4.
change the qualitative behavior of threshold games. More precisely, the condi-
tions for a mixed ESS mentioned above continue to hold even when the group
benefit varies with the number of cooperators as illustrated by Figure 1B.12 In
this way, despite its simplicity, modeling the group benefit as a sharp function
provides a reasonable approximation of the type of social dilemma associated
with group tasks when individuals lack information about the strategy of other
players.
3.3 Group tasks under harsh environments
The previous two sections made the case that individuals possess incentives to
both cooperate and defect in group tasks when individuals do not know what
others will do (Sections 3.1 and 3.2). As a result, it is expected that individuals
will cooperate with a certain probability. But how high should this probability
be?
A reasonable hypothesis is that, even without knowing if others will coop-
12Similarly, Archetti and Scheuring ([2011]) show that the replicator dynamics of a threshold
game, the Volunteer’s Dilemma, admits a mixed equilibrium regardless of whether the group
benefit is modeled by an S-shaped function (smooth condition) or a Heaviside step function
(sharp condition).
13
erate, the harsher the environment the higher the incentive to bet on cooper-
ating. Organisms live in ‘harsh’ environments when the cost of not completing
a particular group task is sufficiently high (Dugatkin, [1997]). For the sake of
illustration, suppose a group of hunters lives in an environment in which mam-
moths are the only type of animal available to hunt, and that a critical number
of volunteers is required to hunt a mammoth successfully. This environment is
extremely harsh because, if there are not enough volunteers, everyone pays a
high price; that is, the whole group fails to obtain enough food to survive.13
The effect of harsh environments on the level of cooperation within groups is
well-documented in several species (Bourke, [2011]). For example, a compara-
tive study involving distinct species of starlings shows that cooperative breeding
is positively correlated with semi-arid savanna habitats and environments with
temporally variable rainfall (Rubenstein and Lovette, [2007]). Moreover, harsh
environments are crucial for explaining the social behaviors of microbes.
Microbes are notorious for their tenacity in hostile environments. In the
case of bacteria, this is largely attributed to their formation of ‘biofilms’, which
allow them to withstand a wide range of environmental perturbations, including
antimicrobial treatments (Stewart and Costerton, [2001]), host immune defenses
(Fux et al., [2005]), UV radiation (Elasri and Miller, [1999]), and protozoan
predators (Matz and Kjelleberg, [2005]). Moreover, the resilience of biofilms
and other microbial groups often require a critical number of cooperators to
manifest (Rauch et al., [2017]). For instance, a certain number of bacterial cells
need to stick together in order to form a microcolony that is large enough to
13Bourke ([2011]) advances a related idea. He suggests that selfish members within a group
might limit their own reproduction if they ‘damage group growth, survival, or productivity to
such an extent that they impair their own reproductive success’ (p. 140). Transmissible can-
cers, such as the canine transmissible venereal tumor, illustrate such a possibility. The reason
is cancerous cells (selfish members) can drive their hosts—and, consequently, themselves—to
extinction if cancerous cells do not limit their own reproductive success. In this way, trans-
missible cancers can be thought of as living in extremely harsh environments. I thank one of
the referees for suggesting this comparison.
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deter protozoan grazers (Matz and Kjelleberg, [2005]). Pseudomonas aeruginosa
biofilms collapse if enough cells do not contribute to the construction of the
biofilm (Rainey and Rainey, [2003]). In yeast, a higher proportion of cooperators
can increase the resilience of the population against perturbations (Sanchez
and Gore, [2013]). Accordingly, harsh environments can foster cooperation in
microbial groups by increasing the cost of not having enough cooperators to
maintain the group.
The concept of harsh environments helps distinguish two types of costs asso-
ciated with group tasks. First, there is the ‘individual’-level cost for cooperating.
For instance, microbial cells often cooperate by producing public goods, such
as polymers, which incur a metabolic cost to the producer. Moreover, there is
a ‘group’-level cost when there are not enough cooperators to complete a group
task, such as hunting a mammoth. Groups are considered to be living in ‘harsh
environments’ when the group-level costs are sufficiently high relative to the
individual-level costs. In contrast, groups are considered to be living in ‘mild
environments’ when the group-level cost is low relative to the individual-level
cost (Dugatkin, [1997]). When the strategies of the other players are unknown,
mild environments increase the incentive for players to bet on free-riding; in
contrast, harsh environments increase the incentive to bet on cooperating.
When groups live in harsh environments, redundancy might evolve as a by-
product from selection at the organism level. Without knowing what others will
do, players must rely on the type of environment to decide how much they will
bet on cooperating. The harsher the environment, the higher their incentive
to bet on cooperating. However, by increasing the chance that individuals will
cooperate, harsh environments indirectly increase the chance of the evolution
of redundant groups. In other words, redundant groups initially evolve not be-
cause there is selection ‘for’ redundancy. Instead, harsh environments select for
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individuals that are willing to pay for the individual-level cost for cooperating
despite the possibility of being taken advantage of by free-riders. As an inci-
dental consequence, harsh environments increase the chance that groups will
contain more cooperators than strictly necessary to complete the group task.
As an example, consider the threshold game discussed previously (Section 3.2).
By manipulating the costs and benefits in this game, we can simulate how the
mixed ESS changes when individuals live in harsher environments. Since indi-
viduals at the mixed ESS cooperate around 46% of the time, the group might
end up with different numbers of cooperators. Specifically, the chance that i
out of N members of the group are cooperators at ESS is summarized by the
graph below:
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The level of ‘harshness’ of an environment is due to the difference in the
expected payoff between when the group task is successfully performed from
when it fails to be completed. Accordingly, in order to simulate a harsher
environment, suppose b = 100c (instead of b = 5c). The mixed ESS is now
≈ 0.74 (instead of ≈ 0.48). Moreover, the probability that the group will have
at least four cooperators to complete the group task successfully is, as expected,
considerably higher:
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As the environment becomes harsher, the probability distribution is supposed
to shift to the right because individuals have a higher incentive to complete
the group task. As an incidental consequence, the probability that a redundant
group (that is, a group with more than four cooperators) will evolve also in-
creases. For instance, in the last graph, the chance of having eight cooperators
is higher than the chance of having four cooperators in the group even though
only four cooperators are required to complete the group task successfully. Ad-
ditionally, redundancy evolves despite the fact that the players do not know the
strategy of the other group members.
Harsh environments can only account for redundancy if group members pos-
sess limited information about the strategy of others. The incentive to cooperate
increases in harsh environments because the group faces the uncertainty of not
having enough cooperators to produce a vital collective benefit, such as pro-
tection against predators. In contrast, an individual that knows the strategy
of others will only cooperate when the number of cooperators is just below
the threshold value required to complete the group task. As a result, in the
absence of within-group policing, being well-informed about the strategies of
other players would undermine the evolution of redundancy.
Policing can be thought of as emulating harsh environments within groups.
According to Birch ([2012]), policing can enable the evolution of redundancy by
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increasing the costs associated with free-riding, which makes cooperation more
cost-effective. Similarly, harsh environments coupled with lack of information
perform a similar role: the risk of failing to produce a critical group benefit adds
a further cost to being a free-rider.14 In this way, the explanation proposed in
this paper can be viewed as complementing Birch’s account. In systems in which
players have limited information about the strategies of others, redundancy
might be due to harsh environments.15 Nevertheless, when groups contain well-
informed individuals, harsh environments can no longer explain the evolution
of redundancy. In such cases, as suggested by Birch ([2012]), the evolution of
redundancy might require the presence of coercive behaviors within the group.
4 Conclusion
Redundancy is probably adaptive at the group-level because redundant groups
tend to be more resilient to environmental perturbations (e.g., predation) than
non-redundant groups (Charbonneau et al., [2017]). Still, the group-level bene-
fits due to redundancy fail to explain why within-group selection does not favor
free-riders (Birch, [2012]). The main take-home message of this paper is that
harsh environments, when coupled with lack of information about the strategy
of the other players, increase the chance that the reproductive interests of the
group and its members align with each other. At the group-level, redundancy is
adaptive because it increases the resilience of groups to hostile environments; at
14The suggestion that policing can be viewed as a type of harsh environment produced by
group members appears in Dugtakin’s ([2000]) discussion of mutualism in humans. In order to
motivate his point, Dugatkin cites Ridley’s ([1997]) idea that the invention of the dart thrower
not only enabled humans to kill large mammals more easily, but it also enabled humans to
threaten others that would not cooperate in the hunt. As Dugatkin puts it, ‘[t]he newest
element of the harsh environment that might have boomeranged against a cheater was the
fellow next to him, who not only wasn’t happy that the cheater skipped out on the hunt while
still expecting a meal, but who also happened to be carrying a rather dangerous weapon’
(Dugatkin, [2000], p. 99).
15Despite our cognitive abilities, humans often see themselves in situations in which a de-
cision has to be made without knowing what others will do. The bystander effect nicely
illustrates this type of situation (Darley and Latane´, [1968]; Diekmann, [1985]).
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the individual-level, redundancy evolves because individuals are shortsighted.
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